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EQUAL PROTECTION AND THE 
UNDOCUMENTED IMMIGRANT: 
CALIFORNIA'S PROPOSITION 187 
KRISTEN M. SCHULER* 
''Who among us is aboriginal? Indeed those who are abo-
riginal, the ones we call Native Americans, are the only 
ones we treat as badly as we treat new immigrants. "1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Proposition 187,2 the recently passed California ballot InItIative 
which seeks to deny all social services except emergency medical care 
to undocumented immigrants,3 has caused significant controversy in 
the State of California and around the nation. The legal battles which 
began the day after the passage of the initiative are likely to continue 
for months or years. Meanwhile, California Governor Pete Wilson has 
ordered that regulations be drafted to facilitate the implementation of 
the measure should it survive judicial scrutiny.4 The determination and 
vested interests of advocates on both sides of the issue could bring the 
Proposition, or at least major parts of it, before the U.S. Supreme Court 
for decision.5 
* Executive Editor, BOSTON COLLEGE THIRD WORLD LAw JOURNAL. 
I Stephen Yagman, attorney for schoolchildren opposing Proposition 187, quoted during 
oral argument in Reporter's Transcript of Proceedings at 9, League of United Latin Am. Citizens 
v. Wilson, No. CV. 94-7569 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 14, 1994), available in LEXIS, Hottop Library, Extra 
File. 
2 State of California, Proposition 187, available in LEXIS, Hottop Library, Extra File [here-
inafter Proposition 187J. 
3 I am choosing to use the term "undocumented immigrants" to describe those individuals 
residing in the United States who have not been documented as residents. Such people have also 
been referred to as "illegal aliens" throughout history, and therefore that term will be used where 
appropriate to accurately reflect certain time periods. 
4 LULAC Transcript at 26, League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Wilson, No. CV. 94-7569 
(S.D. Cal. Dec. 14, 1994), available in LEXIS, Hottop Library, Extra File. 
5 See Paul Feldman, State Suit Over Prop. 187 is Moved to Federal Court, LA. TiMES, Feb. 24, 
1995, at 21 [hereinafter Feldman, State Suit Moved]; David Savage, High Court to Hear Welfare 
Challenge, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 17, 1995, at 15. 
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This type of xenophobic and exclusionary measure is not new for 
California.6 For most of this century, California has passed laws and 
supported policies designed to deny services, opportunities and per-
sonal freedoms to its non-white residents, often regardless of their 
citizenship status.7 Most of the more recent measures have been levied 
against those of Mexican or Central American origin,S while pre-World 
War II measures were directed toward Japanese immigrants or Japanese 
Americans.9 Action taken against Hispanic immigrants, both documented 
and undocumented, has been widespread throughout the latter part 
of this century.IO Today that discrimination continues with Proposition 
187, which deprives undocumented immigrants of most public social 
services. ll It represents a ripe opportunity for the Supreme Court to 
clarify the rights of undocumented immigrants in this country and 
shed some light on an issue that is in the forefront of the conservative 
political debate. 
This Note will begin with a discussion of Proposition 187, its 
immediate effects, and the central arguments both in favor of the 
measure and against it. It will also review the preliminary legal chal-
lenges to the Proposition and the results of those challenges. Next, this 
Note will explore background on the treatment of two groups of 
non-white immigrants in California, Japanese and Hispanic, and the 
judicial response to measures designed to deprive these groups of their 
rights. Finally, it will explore a potential equal protection analysis of 
Proposition 187 by the current Supreme Court. 
II. PROPOSITION 187-AN EMBATTLED REFERENDUM 
AND ITS INITIAL LEGAL CHALLENGES 
On November 8, 1994, the voters of California passed the ballot 
initiative known as Proposition 187 which would deny almost all social 
6 See RACISM IN CALIFORNIA: A READER IN THE HISTORY OF OPPRESSION v (Roger Daniels & 
Spencer C. Olin, Jr. eds., 1972) [hereinafter RACISM IN CALIFORNIA]; see generally TOMAS ALMA-
GUER, RACIAL FAULTLINES: THE HISTORICAL ORIGINS OF WHITE SUPREMACY IN CALIFORNIA 
(1994) (giving an extensive view of the situation of immigrants and Native-Americans in California 
before the twentieth century). 
7 See generally ALMAGUER, supra note 6. 
8 See generally LEO R. CHAVEZ, SHADOWED LIVES-UNDOCUMENTED IMMIGRANTS IN AMERI-
CAN SOCIETY (1992) (an anthropological study of undocumented immigrants in Southern Cali-
fornia). 
9 See RACISM IN CALIFORNIA, supra note 6, at vi-vii. 
10 See generally CHAVEZ, supra note 8. 
11 The Message of Prap. 187, WASH. POST, Nov. 13, 1994 at C6; see Praposition 187, supra note 2. 
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services to undocumented immigrants,l2 Proponents of the measure 
have claimed predominantly economic justifications, contending that 
12 The relevant text of the proposed law is as follows: 
SECTION 5. Exclusion of Illegal Aliens from Public Social Services. Section 
10001.5 is added to the Welfare and Institutions Code, to read: 10001.5. (a) In order 
to carry out the intention of the People of California that only citizens of the United 
States and aliens lawfully admitted to the United States may receive the benefits of 
public social services and to ensure that all persons employed in the providing of 
those services shall diligently protect public funds from misuse, the provisions of 
this section are adopted. (b) A person shall not receive any public social services 
to which he or she may be otherwise entitled until the legal status of that person 
has been verified as one of the following: (1) a citizen of the United States. (2) An 
alien lawfully admitted as a permanent resident. (3) An alien lawfully admitted for 
a temporary period of time. (c) If any public entity in this state to whom a person 
has applied for public social services determines or reasonably suspects, based upon 
the information provided to it, that the person is an alien in the United States in 
violation of federal law, the following procedures shall be followed by the public 
entity: (1) The entity shall not provide the person with benefits or services. (2) The 
entity shall, in writing, notify the person of his or her apparent illegal immigration 
status, and that the person must either obtain legal status or leave the United States. 
(3) The entity shall also notify the State Director of Social Services, the Attorney 
General of California, and the United States Immigration and Naturalization Serv-
ice of the apparent illegal status, and shall provide any additional information that 
may be requested by any other public entity. 
SECTION 6. Exclusion of Illegal Aliens from Publicly Funded Health Care. 
Chapter 1.3 (commencing with Section 130) is added to Part 1 of Division 1 of the 
Health and Safety Code to read: Chapter 1.3. Publicly-Funded Health Care Services 
130. (a) In order to carry out the intention of the People of California that, 
excepting emergency medical care as required by federal law, only citizens of the 
United States and aliens lawfully admitted to the United States may receive the 
benefits of publicly-funded health care, and to ensure that all persons employed in 
the providing of those services shall diligently protect public funds from misuse, 
the provisions of this section are adopted. (b) A person shall not receive any health 
care services from a publicly-funded health care facility, to which he or she is 
otherwise entitled, until the legal status of that person has been verified as one of 
the following: (1) A citizen of the United States. (2) An alien lawfully admitted as 
a permanent resident. (3) An alien lawfully admitted for a temporary period of 
time. (c) If any publicly-funded health care facility in this state, from whom a person 
seeks health care services, other than emergency medical care as required by federal 
law, determines or reasonably suspects, based upon the information provided to it, 
that the person is an alien in the United States in violation of federal law, the 
following procedures shall be followed by the facility: (1) The facility shall not 
provide the person with services. (2) The facility shall, in writing, notify the person 
of his or her apparent illegal immigration status, and that the person must either 
obtain legal status or leave the United States. (3) The facility shall also notify the 
State Director of Health Services, the Attorney General of California, and the 
United States Immigration and Naturalization Service of the apparent illegal status, 
and shall provide any additional information that may be requested by any other 
public entity. (d) For purposes of this section "publicly funded health care facility" 
shall be defined as specified in Sections 1200 and 1250 of this code as of January 
I, 1993. 
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the 1.6 million undocumented immigrants in California have caused 
the state to approach bankruptcy; it is estimated that between $2 billion 
and $5 billion is spent annually on public services to the undocu-
mented population.13 They also maintain that passage of the measure 
will send a message to the federal government that the State of Cali-
fornia demands enforcement of federal immigration laws.14 
Opponents of the Proposition claim that it is a racist measure, that 
eliminating undocumented children from schools would create a new 
illiterate underclass, and that denying medical care to undocumented 
SECTION 7. Exclusion of Illegal Aliens from Public Elementary and Secondary 
Schools. Section 48215 is added to the Education Code, to read: 48215. (a) No 
public elementary or secondary school shall admit, or permit the attendance of, 
any child who is not a citizen of the United States, an alien lawfully admitted as a 
permanent resident, or a person who is otherwise authorized under federal law to 
be present in the United States. (b) Commencing January 1, 1995, each school 
district shall verity the legal status of each child enrolling in the school district for 
the first time in order to ensure the enrollment or attendance only of citizens, aliens 
lawfully admitted as permanent residents, or persons who are otherwise authorized 
under federal law to be present in the United States. (c) By January 1, 1996, each 
school district shall have verified the legal status of each child already enrolled and 
in attendance in the school district in order to ensure the enrollment or attendance 
only of citizens, aliens lawfully admitted as permanent residents, or persons who 
are otherwise authorized to be present in the United States. (d) By January 1,1996, 
each school district shall also have verified the legal status of each parent or 
guardian of each child referred to in subdivisions (b) and (c), to determine whether 
such parent or guardian is one of the following: (1) A citizen of the United States. 
(2) An alien lawfully admitted as a permanent resident. (3) An alien lawfully 
admitted for a temporary period of time. (e) Each school district shall provide 
information to the State Superintendent of Public Instruction, the Attorney Gen-
eral of California, and the United States Immigration and Naturalization Service 
regarding any enrollee or pupil, or parent or guardian, attending a public elemen-
tary or secondary school in the school district determined or reasonably suspected 
to be in violation of federal immigration laws within forty-five days after becoming 
aware of an apparent violation. The notice shall also be provided to the parent or 
legal guardian of the enrollee or pupil, and shall state that an existing pupil may 
not continue to attend the school after ninety calendar days from the date of the 
notice, unless legal status is established. (f) For each child who cannot establish 
legal status in the United States, each school district shall continue to provide 
education for a period of ninety days from the date of the notice. Such ninety day 
period shall be utilized to accomplish an orderly transition to a school in the child's 
country of origin. Each school district shall fully cooperate in this transition effort 
to ensure that the educational needs of the child are best served for that period of 
time [hereinafter Proposed Law]. 
13 Brad Hayward, Prop. 187 Charges to Victory, SACRAMENTO BEE, Nov. 9, 1994, at Al [here-
inafter Hayward, Prop. 187 Charges]. 
14 Ken McLaughlin, California Approves Proposition 187; ChaUenges Loom, ARIZ. REp., Nov. 9, 
1994, at Al [hereinafter McLaughlin, ChaUenges Loom]. 
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immigrants would lead to the spread of disease and the birth of un-
healthy United States citizens. I5 Finally, they express fear that its pas-
sage and implementation would threaten federal funding for the state, 
since many federal grant programs are specifically designed for the 
provision of services to immigrants. I6 Despite these rational and com-
pelling public policy objections, the measure has garnered extensive 
political support, especially from Republicans like California Governor 
Pete Wilson, whose support of the measure may have been the decid-
ing factor in his victory over non-supporting gubernatorial challenger 
Kathleen Brown. 17 The initiative was also a major issue in the California 
Senatorial race as incumbent victor Dianne Feinstein opposed the 
measure, while her opponent, Michael Huffington, endorsed it.I8 
However, Republican leaders Jack Kemp, former Secretary of Hous-
ing and Urban Development, and William Bennett, former Secretary 
of Education, have publicly denigrated the measure, and have been 
accused of being disloyal to Pete Wilson, a fellow Republican, because 
of their actions. I9 Kemp has called the measure unconstitutional and 
un-Republican, while Bennett has expressed his opinion that it fosters 
racism, which he considers "poison in a democracy. "20 
The anti-immigrant sentiment embodied in the initiative has led 
to some radically racist suggestions. One California state assemblyman 
has proposed that identification cards should be required for all His-
panics in California, regardless of their citizenship statuS.2I Proposition 
187 itself also includes extreme provisions, such as companions to 
federal law requiring employers to verify the documentation of pro-
spective employees, and to refuse to hire those not able to comply.22 It 
also contains provisions which require children to report their parents, 
15Id. Both the U.S. Constitution and federal law provide that all persons born on U.S. soil 
are natural-born citizens, regardless of the status of their parents. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, 
§ 1; 8 U.S.C. § 1401a (1994); Butlerv. Penix, 171 F.2d 761, 762 (5th Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 337 
U.S. 926. 
16 Hayward, Prop. 187 Charges, supra note 13, at AI. 
17 David S. Broder, WiLmn Wants Feds to Pay for Illegals, PLAIN DEALER, Feb. 19, 1995, at lC. 
18 Mary McGrory, Decency in Dissent, WASH. POST, Oct. 25, 1994, at A2 [hereinafter McGrory, 
Decency in Dissent]. 
19Id. 
20Id. In a year during which Jack Kemp has had presidential ambitions, his stance on 
Proposition 187 may be politically unpopular, and he has already been told that he can "forget 
about California." Id. 
21Id. 
228 U.S.C. § 1324a (1994). 
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and teachers to report their students, for being undocumented.23 As 
one Los Angeles Board of Education member stated, 
The proposition states that those "suspected" of not being 
legally documented will be questioned. That means anyone 
who looks foreign, speaks with an accent or doesn't fit into 
the stereotype of a blond, blue-eyed, red-blooded American. 
This would create conflict, paranoia and controversy.24 
Already, United States citizens who appear Hispanic are asked to 
show their documentation on a regular basis.25 These citizens fear 
that Proposition 187 will legitimize these harassing inquiries.26 
Negative repercussions of Proposition 187 are already being felt. 
The portion of the act purporting to deny medical care to undocu-
mented persons has been particularly harmful. Even before the elec-
tion, while proponents harangued about the money denial of medical 
care would save, opponents were countering that disease could spread 
more easily without medical care, even to the documented and citizen 
population.27 Within the two weeks after the measure passed, hospital 
outpatient clinics and community facilities reported a ten to twenty 
percent decline in patient visits, since undocumented patients feared 
deportation if they kept their appointments.28 One death has already 
been blamed on the measure; a 12-year-old boy died of leukemia 
complications when his parents, hearing of the passage of the propo-
sition, were afraid to take him to his clinic appointments.29 
The Initial Legal Challenges to Proposition 187 
As expected, given the drastic nature of Proposition 187 and 
adverse human consequences, several legal challenges to halt its im-
plementation were launched immediately after its passage.30 In these 
23 See Proposed Law, supra note 12 at Section 7; McGrory, Decency in Dissent, supra note 18, 
atA2. 
24 Alicia Doyle & Antonio Olivo, Prop. 187's Impact Upon Race Relations, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 4, 
1994, at 2. 
25 Peter H. King, On Californifr-They Kept Coming, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 9, 1994, at 3. 
26 See id. 
27 McLaughlin, Challenges Loom, supra note 14, at AI. 
28 Immigrants Wary of Clinic Visits, WASH. POST, Nov. 27, 1994, at A4. 
29 Lee Romney & Jeff Brazil, Boy's Death Stirs Debate Over California's Immigrant Initiative, 
WASH. POST, Nov. 25, 1994, at A3. 
30 E.g., League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Wilson, No. 94-7569 MRP Urx) (C.D. Cal. 
Nov. 15, 1994) available in LEXIS, Hottop Library, Extra File; Gregorio T. v. Wilson, No. 94-7652 
JMI (GHlx) (C.D. Cal. Nov. 9, 1994) available in LEXIS, Hottop Library, Extra File. 
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preliminary proceedings, the California Attorney General's Office and 
Governor Wilson have been mostly unsuccessful in both federal and 
state courts as they attempt to defend their referendum.31 One repre-
sentative legal action attacking the entire initiative is a Civil Rights 
Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief in the class action 
Gregorio T. v. Wilmn, in which most of the named plaintiffs are repre-
sented by the ACLU Foundation of Southern California.32 The com-
plaint states five causes of action challenging the constitutionality of 
Proposition 187.33 Most significantly for the purposes of this Note, the 
plaintiff class claims that the initiative violates their Fourteenth Amend-
ment Equal Protection rights. 34 
The Equal Protection component of the ACLU complaint main-
tains that Proposition 187 creates a class of undocumented immigrants, 
defined as "persons suspected of not meeting the state's immigration 
standards," and denies that class public benefits which the state grants 
others similarly situated.35 The plaintiffs claim that the classification is 
suspect or quasi-suspect, and that the rights denied are fundamental 
or quasi-fundamentaP6 They also allege an absence of a compelling or 
important state interest for the classification or denial of rights.37 Fi-
nally, they maintain that the classification and denial of rights is not 
necessary or narrowly tailored to accomplish any legitimate state pur-
poses.38 To support these contentions, the plaintiffs cite the California 
31 See, e.g., LULAC Stipulated Restraining Order, League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. 
Wilson, No. 94-7569-MRP (C.D. Cal. Nov. 22, 1994). 
32 Gregorio T., No. 94-7652 JMI (GHIX), slip op. at 1. 
33 Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief of Plaintiff Gregorio T., Gregorio T. v. 
Wilson, No. 94-7652 JMI (GHlx) (C.D. Cal. Nov. 9, 1994) available in LEXIS, Hottop Library, 
Extra File [hereinafter Gregorio T. Complaint]. 
34Id. at '1'1 53-57. The plaintiffs also claim that Proposition 187 violates the Supremacy 
Clause of the Constitution, Article VI, Clause 2. They claim that the states have no power to pass 
any laws regulating or burdening immigration, which is relegated to the Federal Government by 
Article 1, Section 8, Clause 4, or laws which burden foreign affairs, relegated to the Federal 
Government by Article 1, Section 8, Clauses 1,3, and 10-16; Article II, Section 2, Clauses 1 and 
2, Section 3. Id. at'll'l 39-43. Another cause of action raised by the plaintiffs is that Proposition 
187 is preempted by the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101, which they claim 
"strikes a delicate balance between the rights of the nation to regulate immigration and the rights 
of aliens within the country" and should not be altered by state action. Id. at 'I'll 44-52. The 
plaintiffs also argue that Proposition 187 violates the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Id. at 
n 65-68. 
35 See id. at 'I 54. 
36Id. at 'I 55. 
37Id. 
38Id. 
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Constitution's provisions recognizing not only education as a funda-
mental right, but also the property rights of aliens. 39 
The nine named plaintiffs in this class allege various potential 
harms from the implementation of Proposition 187, ranging from 
deportation to death.40 Seven-year-old encephalitis patient Gregorio T. 
maintains that he would enter a permanent vegetative state should his 
medical treatment be ceasedY Xiomara T. claims that she will not seek 
prenatal care out of fear of deportation to Nicaragua, where nine of 
her relatives have already been assassinated and where she has received 
death threats.42 Thirteen-year-old Carlos P. argues that since he has 
recently had a kidney transplant, the loss of medical care will render 
him unable to receive anti-rejection medication which will undoubt-
edly cause his death.43 The other named plaintiffs claim similar poten-
tial harm from both the denial of services and possible deportation to 
their native countries.44 
The plaintiffs requested relief in the form of a declaration of the 
unconstitutionality of Proposition 187, the issuance of a Temporary 
Restraining Order, and a Preliminary Injunction enjoining the defen-
dants from implementing and enforcing Proposition 187.45 On Novem-
ber 22, 1994 Judge Mariana Pfaelzer issued a Stipulated Restraining 
Order preventing the implementation of Section 7 of Proposition 187 
denying education to undocumented children.46 In December of 1994, 
after extensive argument, she issued a preliminary injunction halting 
the denial of education, medical and social services, as well as the 
reporting requirements embodied in the initiativeY 
In her order granting the injunction, Judge Pfaelzer stated that 
she had considered the state's interest not only in the fact that 60% of 
the voters had approved Proposition 187, but also in conserving their 
resources.48 Despite this statement, the request for injunction as to 
sections four, five, six, seven, and nine-the main sections denying 
39 Id. at 'J. 56. 
40 See id. at on 15-23. 
41 Id. at'l[ 15. 
42 Id. at'll 16. 
43 Id. at'll 18. 
44 See id. at 'I'll 15-23. 
45 Id. at on 69-74. 
46 LULAC Stipulated Restraining Order, League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Wilson, No. 
94-7569-MRP (C.D. Cal. Nov. 22, 1994). 
47 See LULAC Transcript at 40, League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Wilson, No. CV. 
94-7569 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 14, 1994), available in LEXIS, Hottop Library, Extra File. 
48 Id. at 37. 
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services-was granted on preemption, due process and equal protec-
tion reasoning.49 Judge Pfaelzer agreed with the plaintiffs that the 
hardships caused by the measure undoubtedly fell on the plaintiff class 
for all of the enjoined measures. 50 In assessing the plain tiffs' likelihood 
of success on the merits, she cited to precedent and relevant law to 
indicate her belief that there was at least a "fair chance of success" on 
all challenges.51 
In response to subsequent requests by the plaintiffs' attorneys 
citing the harmful consequences of the passage of Proposition 187 
previously discussed, Judge Pfaelzer later issued a directive order to 
state officials. 52 They were required to make clear to state employees 
and to the public that there would be no enforcement of the elements 
of Proposition 187 denying social services.53 The order required that 
state officials distribute a copy of the preliminary injunction to school 
districts, police agencies, publicly funded health care facilities and 
government health and welfare offices across California, and that in-
formation bulletins explaining the document be posted in those areas 
as well.54 
In another ruling strongly opposed by the state, Judge Pfaelzer 
allowed the California Association of Catholic Hospitals and the Catho-
lic Health Association of the United States to intervene in the lawsuit 
on theological and legal grounds. 55 Their petition to intervene cited 
their moral obligation as Catholic institutions to provide medical care 
to all persons regardless of citizenship, and they plan to offer expertise 
about the potential impact of implementation on hospitals. 56 This 
ruling is important as it indicates Judge Pfaelzer's willingness to hear 
all sides of the Proposition 187 issue and to examine it carefully, which 
the State undoubtedly realizes is not in the measure's best interest. The 
church is likely to raise some of the moral and religious arguments 
that the state seeks to prevent since they could have significant emo-
tional impact. 
49Id. at 40; see Proposed Law, supra note 12. 
50Id. at 39, 40. 
51Id. at 38. 
52 Paul Feldman, State Must Tea Public About Prop. 187 Delay, LA. TiMEs,Jan. 20, 1995, at 3 
[hereinafter Feldman, State Must Tea Public]. 
53Id. 
54Id. 
55 Paul Feldman, Judge Allows 2 Church Groups to Enter Prop. 187 Court Fight, LA. TIMES, 
Jan. 10, 1995, at 3. 
56Id. 
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Consequently, the federal injunction issued by Judge Pfaelzer has 
already been appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals by the State of 
California, where success is unlikely since the Ninth Circuit would have 
to find that the judge abused her discretion in issuing the order. 57 
Governor Wilson has also retaliated by filing a suit in Superior Court 
in San Francisco in an attempt to remove the issue from federal court. 58 
In that suit, the State of California maintains that a state court ruling, 
such as the one sought by Wilson, barring Proposition 187's educa-
tional provisions from taking effect, removes the need for a federal 
injunction, and that Judge Pfaelzer should therefore abstain from 
deciding the case.59 In the concerted effort to halt the progress of the 
federal lawsuit, the California Attorney General's office also filed a 
motion for abstention in Judge Pfaelzer's court on February 3, 1995.60 
They maintained that "it is well settled that it is the province of the 
state courts to construe state law," and threatened a motion to dismiss 
if the judge refused to abstain.61 The basis for the state's argument is 
that since Proposition 187 is a state law, the state must have a reason-
able opportunity to interpret it before the constitutionality is decided 
by a federal judge.62 The major problem for California is that the 
initiative clearly implicates the protections of the United States Consti-
tution, which will ultimately be interpreted by federal courtS.63 
On November 20, 1995, in the last ruling preceding this publica-
tion, Judge Pfaelzer struck down most of Proposition 187 on federal 
preemption grounds, stating that it created an "impermissible state 
57 Feldman, State Suit Moved, supra note 5, at 2l. 
58 Patrick]. McDonnell, State Appeals U.S. Order Blocking Prop. 187, LA. TIMES, Jan. 31, 1995, 
at 18 [hereinafter McDonnell, State Appeals]. 
59Id. 
60 See Paul Feldman, State Asks judge to Dismiss Prop. 187 Case, LA. TIMES, Feb. 4, 1995, at 
22. [hereinafter Feldman, State Asks judge to Dismiss]. 
61 Id. ACLU attorney Mark Rosenbaum indicated his disapproval of this forum shopping 
posture, and his belief that the suit will eventually end up in federal court by quipping, "[t]hey 
are ignoring the advice of the great constitutional scholar Muhammad Ali, who said, 'you can 
run, but you can't hide.'" See Paul Feldman, State Tries to Wrest Prop. 187 Case From U.S. judge, 
L.A. TIMES, Feb. 21, 1995, at 3. 
62 See Feldman, State Asks judge to Dismiss, supra note 60, at 3. The relevant abstention 
doctrine for this case is the Pullman doctrine. That doctrine states that a federal court must 
abstain from deciding an issue when state law is uncertain and a state court's clarification of state 
law might make a federal court's constitutional ruling unnecessary. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FED-
ERALJURISDICTION 595 (1989). 
63 See Feldman, State Asks judge to Dismiss, supra note 60, at 3. Governor Wilson has had little 
success in federal court on another immigration matter as well. On February 13, a federal judge 
dismissed his lawsuit against the federal government to recover the costs of serving illegal 
immigrants. Around the Nation -Reimbursement Denied, WASH. POST, Feb. 14, 1995, at All. Wilson 
has vowed to appeal that decision all the way to the u.s. Supreme Court. Id. 
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scheme to regulate immigration. "64 The only portions she did not strike 
down were fine and sentencing provisions for those convicted of manu-
facturing or selling false citizenship documents.65 A motion to recon-
sider the ruling was filed on November 30, 1995 by the State of Cali-
fornia, and Judge Pfaelzer has instructed attorneys on both sides to 
point out any unresolved issues, and has set a future hearing date. 66 
Despite the severity ofPfaelzer's ruling, Proposition 187 supporters are 
quick to point out that they will exercise their right to appeal to a 
higher court, and that legislation similar to Proposition 187 is currently 
pending in Congress, where complete power over immigration un-
doubtedly lies.57 
Proposition 187 has not received a positive response in state court 
either.68 Judge Stuart Pollak of the San Francisco Superior Court issued 
a preliminary injunction blocking the provision barring undocumented 
immigrants from attending public universities, stating that the petition-
ers were likely to prevail at trial. 69 Judge Pollak had issued a temporary 
64 Laura Mecoy, Prop. 187 Backers Hope to Win Appeal, SAN FRANCISCO EXAMINER, Nov. 24, 
1995, at A27. 
65 Proposition 187 Hearing Set, SACRAMENTO BEE, Nov. 30, 1995, at B2. 
66Id. 
67 Mecoy, supra note 64, at A27. 
68 Maura Dolan, Prop. 187 Ban on Higher Education Blocked, LA. TIMES, Feb. 9, 1995, at 3. 
69Id. The federal injunction issued by Judge Pfaelzer did not block this provision since she 
concluded that she did not have jurisdiction over the state's universities. See LULAC Transcript, 
supra note I, at 40. The text of the section dealing with post secondary education reads as follows: 
SECTION 8. Exclusion of Illegal Aliens from Public Postsecondary Educational 
Institutions. Section 66010.8 is added to the Education Code to read: 66010.8. (a) 
No public institution of postsecondary education shall admit, enroll, or permit the 
attendance of any person who is not a citizen of the United States, an alien lawfully 
admitted as a permanent resident in the United States, or a person who is otherwise 
authorized under federal law to be present in the United States. (b) Commencing 
with the first term or semester that begins after January I, 1995, and at the 
commencement of each term or semester thereafter, each public postsecondary 
educational institution shall verity the status of each person enrolled or in atten-
dance at that institution in order to ensure the enrollment or attendance only of 
United States citizens, aliens lawfully admitted as permanent residents in the United 
States, and persons who are otherwise authorized under federal law to be present 
in the United States. (c) No later than 45 days after the admissions officer of a 
public postsecondary educational institution becomes aware of the application, 
enrollment or attendance of a person determined to be, or who is under reasonable 
suspicion of being, in the United States in violation of federal immigration laws, 
that officer shall provide that information to the state Superintendent of Public 
Instruction, the Attorney General of California, and the United States Immigration 
and Naturalization Service. The Information shall also be provided the applicant, 
enrollee, or person admitted. 
Proposition 187, supra note 2, at § 8. 
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restraining order in November that halted the initiative's denial of 
education on the state levepo 
In the aftermath of these federal and state lawsuits, ensuing re-
straining orders and preliminary injunctions, only one portion of Propo-
sition 187 remains valid, enforceable, and in use: Section 2 which 
provides for a five year sentence or $75,000 fine for those convicted of 
selling false immigration documentation has not been challenged and 
has therefore become part of the penal code.71 However, contrary to 
the wishes of Proposition 187 proponents, the first defendants con-
victed under the initiative entered into a plea bargain granting them 
a lesser sentence than that provided by Section 2.72 Prosecutors main-
tain that the sentence provided by Section 2 is not mandatory, and that 
they have discretion in making plea bargains in such cases.73 Appar-
ently, even the one surviving provision of Proposition 187 is not work-
ing in the manner in which its drafters had envisioned. The extreme 
nature of the measures currently under injunction, and the drastic 
changes their implementation would cause in California, renders them 
open to this very type of resistance by prosecutors. 
Although its draconian proposals may seem a product of new 
conservatism, Proposition 187 does not represent a new philosophy or 
attitude toward immigrants in California; Japanese and Hispanic im-
migrants, both documented and undocumented, have been discrimi-
nated against and legislated against for many years.74 Some measures 
were more successful than others. Most were challenged in the courts 
by civil rights organizations or individuals, with varying judicial re-
sponses. The next two sections will present a survey of the major 
examples of such initiatives and the response of various courts to the 
ensuing challenges. 
70 Dolan, supra note 68, at 3. 
71 Paul Feldman, Forgers Get 6 Months in Prop. 187 Plea Bargain, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 5, 1995, at 
1. [hereinafter Feldman, Forgers Get 6 Months]. The text of the section reads: 
SECTION 2. Manufacture, Distribution or Sale of False Citizenship or Resident 
Alien Documents: Crime and Punishment. Section 113 is added to the Penal Code, 
to read: 113. Any person who manufactures, distributes or sells false documents to 
conceal the true citizenship or resident alien status of another person is guilty of a 
felony, and shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for five years or 
by a fine of seventy-five thousand dollars ($75,000). 
Proposition 187, supra note 2, at § 2. 
72 Id. at 1. 
73Id. 
74 See generally RACISM IN CALIFORNIA, supra note 6 (giving an extensive history of the 
treatment of non-whites in California throughout the Twentieth Century). 
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III. THE JAPANESE EXPERIENCE IN CALIFORNIA 
The Japanese who immigrated to the West Coast of the United 
States in the early part of the twentieth century experienced significant 
difficulties. 75 They had the serious disadvantage of arriving after the 
Chinese, who had previously been the subject of prejudice and exclu-
sion because of their unwillingness to assimilate with Californians.76 
The Japanese came from the same area as the Chinese, were similar 
in physical appearance to the Chinese, and, perhaps most importantly, 
accepted the same low economic rank. 77 Californians fused the two 
groups together and applied their prejudices equally to both. They 
were not content to let the Japanese occupy a higher economic rank 
than had the Chinese, and enacted measures to prevent that eventuality.78 
A. Alien Land Laws 
Even before the Japanese Empire became the enemy of the United 
States in World War II, Californians had begun to promote and pro-
pose policies designed to exclude those of Japanese descent from the 
state and its economy. In the early 1900s, the main goal of citizens was 
to halt the acquisition of agricultural land by Japanese immigrants.79 
In California politics, a main proponent of such initiatives was Demo-
cratic activist James D. Phelan, who wrote to presidential candidate 
Woodrow Wilson in 1911, 
It is vital, I believe, for our civilization [and] for the preser-
vation of our domestic institutions ... that Oriental coolies be 
excluded from these shores .... Even where coolies are capa-
ble of doing a day's work, ... should they be allowed ... to 
lower the standards of living ... of members of the white 
race, who stand for home life, Republican Government and 
Western civilization?80 
75 See generally CAREY MCWILLIAMS, PREJUDICE: JAPANESE AMERICANS, SYMBOL OF RACIAL 
INTOLERANCE (1944) (giving an early twentieth century account of the treatment of the Japanese 
in America). 
76Yamato Ichihashi, AntiJapanese Agitation, in RACISM IN CALIFORNIA, supra note 6, at 105; 
see ALMAGUER, supra note 6, at 154-55. 
77 Ichihashi, supra note 76, at 106. 
78 See id. 
79 Roger Daniels, The Progressives Draw the Color Line, in RACISM IN CALIFORNIA, supra note 
6, at 117. 
8°Id. at 125. 
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In 1913, two different kinds of alien land bills were introduced in 
the California legislature: one barring all aliens from the ownership of 
land, the other barring only those aliens who were "ineligible to citi-
zenship. "81 A bill limiting leases of agricultural land to terms of three 
years, and barring further land purchases by aliens, passed the legisla-
ture and was signed by the Governor of California in May of 1913.82 
The bill represented the first official act of racism and discrimination 
aimed at the Japanese.83 Some citizens of California protested that the 
bill was too easy to circumvent, while others condemned it as inspired 
by the "rudimentary race hatred ... deeply imbedded in the social life 
of California. "84 In 1920, a new Alien Land Act was passed to close the 
loopholes in the 1913 version, but it had little of the effect its propo-
nents desired.85 For some citizens, merely restricting the land owner-
ship of the Japanese was not enough, they wanted their complete 
exclusion from California.86 
The Supreme Court ruled in three separate cases, decided within 
a week of each other in 1923, that California could constitutionally 
exclude aliens ineligible for citizenship from any interest in agricul-
turalland.87 The Supreme Court reasoned that the Fourteenth Amend-
ment was not designed to affect the right of the states to prohibit alien 
ownership or possession of land.88 The Court's reasoning behind sup-
porting California's distinction between aliens eligible for citizenship 
and those not eligible was that the latter group "[c]an never become 
the support and dependence of this nation but remain the support, 
maintenance and dependence of their own government."89 
81 !d. at 128. 
82 See id. at 132. 
83 MCWILLIAMS, supra note 75, at 45. 
84 Daniels, supra note 79, at 133. 
85 MCWILLIAMS, supra note 75, at 64. The average acreage of japanese farms in California 
was reduced from 80.1 acres in 1920 to 44 in 1940, but the total value of their production actually 
increased between those years. Id. 
86 Id.; ALMAGUER, supra note 6, at 186. 
87 Porterfield v. Webb, 263 U.S. 225, 228 (1923); Webb v. O'Brien, 263 U.S. 313, 326 (1923); 
Frick v. Webb, 263 U.S. 326, 334 (1923). In all three cases,justice Butler rendered almost exactly 
the same extremely brief written opinion regarding the constitutional issue. It is interesting to 
note that justices McReynolds and Brandeis did not think there was a justiciable question involved 
in any of the three cases and had promoted dismissal, indicating that the issue of the rights of 
japanese Americans were not very important to the high court. Porterfield, 263 U.S. at 233; 
O'Brien, 263 U.S. at 326; Frick, 263 U.S. at 334. Cf. Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633 (1947) (a 
post World War II decision in which there were two concurring opinions and two dissenting 
opinions rendered in a case involving exactly the same issue, indicating a greater willingness on 
the part of the Court to recognize the rights of the japanese-American). 
88 Porterfield, 263 U.S. at 228. 
89Id. at 229. 
• 
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In 1947, a post-war challenge to that Alien Land Act reached the 
Supreme Court, which declined to rule on the constitutionality of the 
statute since its decision could be reached on other grounds.90 How-
ever, a scathing concurrence by Justice Black expressed his view that 
the statute was a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment.91 Another concurrence by Justice Murphy stated 
that the law" [iJ s rooted deeply in racial, economic and social antago-
nisms. "92 Therefore, although the Court refused to consider the con-
stitutional issue, the sentiments of at least some of its members were 
obvious. 
The California courts soon adopted this sentiment and declared 
their Alien Land Act unconstitutional as violative of the Fourteenth 
Amendment in 1952.93 The Supreme Court of California cited the 
guidance of the Supreme Court of the United States in both Oyama v. 
California and Takahashi v. Fish and Game Commission,94 another case 
upholding the individual rights of the Japanese, and declared the law 
invalid. While the decision was not unanimous, the court emphatically 
overruled previous cases upholding the Alien Land Act, stating that 
the law "[iJs obviously designed and administered as an instrument for 
effectuating racial discrimination .... "95 Unfortunately, this judicial 
recognition of the real purpose behind the legislation came too late 
for the numerous Japanese Americans who had lost their property or 
had it escheat to the state. The type of reasoning and sentiment that 
had led to the passage of the Alien Land Act in the early part of the 
century was a haunting prelude to the justifications given for the 
complete exclusion of the Japanese from American society just twenty 
years later. 
B. Wartime Exclusion and Internment 
The exclusion and internment of Japanese Americans during World 
War II is one of the most egregious and horrible acts of the twentieth 
century, and has been described as "[tJhe most widespread disregard 
of personal rights since ... slavery.''96 The Japanese attack on Pearl 
90 Oyama, 332 U.S. at 647. 
91Id. (Black,]., concurring). 
92Id. at 662 (Murphy,]., concurring). 
93 Fujii v. State, 242 P.2d 617, 639 (Cal. 1952). 
94 334 U.S. 410 (1948). This case invalidated a California statute which denied commercial 
fishing licenses to "aliens ineligible for citizenship" on equal protection grounds. 334 U.S. at 427. 
95 Fujii, 242 P.2d at 630. 
96Roger Daniels, Why It Happened Here, in RACISM IN CALIFORNIA, supra note 6, at 167 
[hereinafter Daniels, Why It Happened Here]. 
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Harbor on December 7, 1941, was an event that sparked terror in the 
minds of West Coast Americans as fears of an attack on the mainland 
became prevalent.97 However, in California, the fear and racism had 
begun even before the bombs fell. 98 
In March of 1935 a California Congressman told his Washington 
colleagues that there were 25,000 armed Japanese on the West Coast 
ready to take to the field in case of war. 99 This ''yellow peril" was partially 
a product of the actions of the California press which referred to 
Japanese as '~aps," "nips," ''yellow men," "mad dogs" and ''yellow ver-
min," all terms which seized upon the fear of Californians and pro-
moted the widespread hysterical racism.loo A 1940 editorial by promi-
nent journalist William Randolph Hearst reads, "Colonel KnoxlOl should 
come out to California and see the myriads of little Japs peacefully 
raising fruits and flowers on California sunshine, and saying hopefully 
... : 'Some day I come with Japanese army and take all this."'102 Given 
this type of pre-Pearl Harbor sentiment and anti:Japanese hysteria, the 
internment of the Japanese was unlikely to offend the sensibilities of 
the majority of Californians. 
In February of 1942, the full West Coast Congressional delegation, 
led by Senator Hiram Johnson of California, submitted a letter to 
President Roosevelt suggesting the immediate evacuation of all persons 
of Japanese lineage from the United States.103 On February 19 Roosevelt 
signed Executive Order No. 9066, authorizing the War Department to 
exclude any or all persons from prescribed military areas.104 General 
De Witt was placed in charge of the military areas, and immediately 
began issuing proclamations which effectively ordered all persons of 
Japanese ancestry to leave the zones. I05 Congress assisted De Witt with 
Public Law No. 503, declaring it a criminal offense for an excluded 
person to refuse to leave.106 Then Attorney General Earl Warren tes-
tified extensively before Congress regarding his belief in the necessity 
97PETER IRONS, JUSTICE AT WAR-THE STORY OF THE JAPANESE AMERICAN INTERNMENT 
CASES 26 (1983). 
98 See generally MCWILLIAMS, supra note 75. 
99Id. at 106-7. 
100Daniels, Why it Happened Here, supra note 96, at 168. 
101 Colonel Knox was then the Secretary of the Navy under President Roosevelt IRONS, supra 
note 97, at 4. 
102 MCWILLIAMS, supra note 75, at 107. 
103Id. at 108. 
104Id. 
105Id. at 109. 
106Id. 
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of exclusion, stating that "[a]ny delay in the adoption of the protective 
measures is to invite disaster ... we too will have in California a Pearl 
Harbor incident. "107 Logistical problems with the evacuation process 
led to the internment of evacuees in "assembly centers" and "relocation 
centers," as the Japanese were given a choice between prison and these 
"concentration camps."108 
The military reasons given for the exclusion of the Japanese were 
numerous and marginally convincing, but the danger of sabotage and 
risk of espionage by Japanese living in the United States were the most 
heavily relied upon by General De Witt. 109 Special interest groups in 
California exerted considerable political pressure in support of mass 
evacuation. 110 These groups were predominantly produce producers in 
a state where Japanese produce production had an estimated annual 
value of $35 million, and where their share of the Los Angeles florist 
business was valued at approximately $4 million annually.lll There is 
no doubt that these special interests stood to gain economically from 
a complete exclusion of Japanese persons, and their influence cannot 
be under-emphasized. ll2 
C. judicial Response 
Although support for exclusion and internment in California's 
political power structure was widespread and militant, a few evacuees 
had the courage to challenge the laws, although their efforts went 
essentially unrewarded. ll3 Four of the plaintiffs' cases reached the Su-
preme Court, either by their agreeing to be part of a test case or by 
chance arrest. 114 Two of the four cases arose out of California incidents; 
they involved Fred Toyosaburo Korematsu and Mitsuye Endo. ll5 
107 The Testimony of Attorney General Earl Warren: Hearings Before the Select Comm. Investigat-
ing National Defense Migration, reprinted in RACISM IN CALIFORNIA, supra note 6, at 153. 
108 See IRONS, supra note 97, at 75. 
109 MCWILLIAMS, supra note 75, at lIO. The Supreme Court later found that there was no 
evidence of disloyalty by Japanese-Americans. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 236 
(1944). 
110 MCWILLIAMS, supra note 72, at 128. 
IlIId. at 127. 
1l2Id. at 128. 
m IRONS, supra note 97, at 75. 
114 !d. 
115 See id. at 93-99. Two prior cases had arisen out of incidents in other West Coast States. 
Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943), was a planned test case in Washington where 
Hirabayashi turned himself in to the FBI and announced his refusal to comply with the evacuation 
order. IRONS, supra note 97, at 88. He was arrested for curfew violations, so his case reached the 
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Fred Korematsu did not intend to be a test case; although he was 
an American citizen, he had in fact undergone plastic surgery after the 
exclusion order was handed down to avoid evacuation. ll6 He was nev-
ertheless arrested and convicted; and his appeal represents a landmark 
Supreme Court decision.1l7 The Court's opinion, like those before it, 
relies heavily on a military necessity argument, emphasizing, "Kore-
matsu was not excluded from the Military Area because of hostility to 
him or his race. He was excluded because we are at war with the 
Japanese Empire."1l8 However, unlike its predecessor decisions involv-
ing curfews,ll9 this case had three dissenting opinions. Justices Roberts, 
Murphy, and Jackson dissented from the Court's ruling, writing sepa-
rate opinions expressing their views that the exclusion and internment 
orders were unconstitutionaJ.l20 Justice Murphy maintained, "[S]uch 
exclusion goes over 'the very brink of constitutional power' and falls 
into the ugly abyss of racism."121 Some members of the Court were 
beginning to recognize that racism and discrimination had almost as 
much to do with the treatment of the Japanese as did military necessity.122 
The final challenge to the internment came in the form of a 
habeas corpus action brought by Mitsuye Endo challenging her deten-
tion in a California relocation center.123 The Court ordered Endo's 
release after she proved her loyalty to the United States, therefore 
severing any rational relationship between her detention and the war-
time anti-espionage campaign.124 Again, the Court did not reach the 
constitutional issue, and Justice Murphy was incited to write a concur-
ring opinion again expressing his view, "[r] acial discrimination of this 
high court on that issue. Id. at 92. The court invoked military necessity and war powers to uphold 
the constitutionality of the curfew, and Hirabayahsi's conviction. See Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 104. 
Similarly, Yasui v. United States, 320 U.S. 115 (1943), was a planned test case in Oregon to 
challenge the curfew proclamation in that area. IRONS, supra note 97, at 81. The case, although 
it was instituted six months before Hirabayashi, reached the court at the same time and was 
published later. The court cited Hirabayashi's precedent and upheld Yasui's conviction in a 
two-page opinion. See Yasui, 320 U.S. at 117. 
116 IRONS, supra note 97, at 96. 
117 Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). 
118 Id., 323 U.S. at 223. 
119 See supra note 115 and accompanying text. 
120 See Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 225-48. 
121 See id. at 233 (Murphy, J., dissenting). 
122 See id. 
123 IRONS, supra note 97, at 100. Her lawyer described the accommodations at the camp, 
located in a converted race track near San Francisco in the following manner, "[tlhey'd put a 
family in a stall big enough for one horse, with whitewash over the manure ... [gluards with 
machine guns stood at the gates." Id. at 102. 
124 See Ex Parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283, 302 (1944). 
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nature bears no reasonable relation to military necessity, and is utterly 
foreign to the ideals and traditions of the American people. "125 
In 1948, Congress passed a statute that would allow those who lost 
real and personal property because of the internment to recover for 
their property damages. 126 The act, as interpreted by the courts, did 
not allow compensation for damages from death or personal injury, 
personal inconvenience, physical hardship, or mental suffering. 127 Over 
26,000 claims were filed and approximately $37 million was distrib-
uted. 128 Therefore, although those traumatized by their experience 
were ultimately reimbursed by the government for their lost property, 
the experiences of the individuals incarcerated by the military are 
unforgettable. 
IV. DOCUMENTED AND UNDOCUMENTED HISPANIC IMMIGRANTS 
Japanese Americans are not the only non-white minority group 
that has been discriminated against and persecuted by Californians. 
Even during the time of the internment, Mexican Americans were 
beginning to experience the same treatment and hysterical persecu-
tion that the Japanese had, but there was no war to justifY it. 129 Al-
though the sense of national danger did not exist with respect to the 
Mexican Americans, discrimination against them was prevalent be-
cause their alledgedly squalid and separate lifestyle increasingly mar-
ginalized them from the white population.130 
Hostility and racist attitudes towards residents and immigrants in 
California from Mexico and Central America has varied historically. An 
article written in the late 1940s described a California where de facto 
discrimination was prevalent while the laws of California purported 
to prevent it. 131 The author described incidents where students on a 
school field trip had to sit in segregated areas of the movie theater, 
one for "whites" and one for "Mexicans."132 He also described a city 
council which placed a sign in the bathhouse of a public pool reading 
125Id. at 308 (Murphy,]. concurring). 
126 Arnerican:Japanese Evacuation Claims Act, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1981-1987 (1988). 
127 Hohri v. United States, 586 F. Supp. 769, 784 (D. D.C. 1984). 
128 [d. at 785. 
129 Ralph H. Turner & Samuel]. Surace, Zoot-Suiters and Mexicans, in RACISM IN CALIFORNIA, 
supra note 6, at 210. 
130 W. Henry Cooke, The Segregation of Mexican-American School Children in Southern Califor-
nia, in RACISM IN CALIFORNIA, supra note 6, at 221-22. 
131 [d. at 223. 
132Id. at 222. 
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FOR WHITE RACE ONLY, and expressly admitted that it was for the 
purpose of keeping out the "Mexican" children who desired to swim 
there. 133 
Anthropologist Leo Chavez has found that heightened concern 
about immigration often follows periods of economic downturn in 
California, such as that occurring in the early 1980s, which may have 
set off a cycle culminating in Proposition 187.134 Over the years, Cali-
fornians, especially residents of southern San Diego county, have en-
gaged in some reasonably harsh action to prevent and discourage 
immigration. One extreme example is the "Light Up the Border" rally, 
where San Diegans line up their cars at the border and shine their 
headlights on it to express their opposition to immigration.135 A 1986 
candidate for the County Board of Supervisors once remarked: 
Nowhere else in San Diego County do you find the huge 
gangs of illegal aliens that line our streets, shake down our 
schoolchildren, spread diseases like malaria, and roam our 
neighborhoods looking for work or homes to rob. We are 
under siege in North County .... 136 
This extreme political sentiment gave rise to many specific measures 
designed to discriminate against those immigrants in nearly every 
aspect of their lives. 
A. English-Only Initiatives: Proposition 63 
Although the movement to declare English the official language 
of the United States has been directed at groups other than the Span-
ish-speaking, in California, they were undoubtedly one of the logi-
cal targets.137 In 1986, California voters passed Proposition 63, which 
amended their state constitution to declare English the official lan-
guage of California. 138 Not intended to be merely symbolic, the amend-
133Id. at 223. 
134CHAVEZ, supra note 8, at 15. 
135Id. at 17. 
136Id. 
137 See Antonio]. Califa, Declaring English the Official Language: Prejudice Spoken Here, 24 
HARV. C.R-C.L. L. REV. 293, 302 (1989). A recent U.S. News & World Report poll indicated that 
73% of Americans favor making English the official language of the government, which would 
mean printing government forms only in English. Susan Headden, One Nation, One Language?, 
U.S. NEWS & WORLD REp., Sept. 25, 1995, at 40. 
138Cal. Const. art. III, § 6(b) (1995). 
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ment gives the legislature the power to enforce it, and directs them 
and state officials to take all necessary steps to ensure that the role of 
the English language is preserved.139 The legislature is also prohibited 
from making a law that diminishes or ignores the role of English as 
the official language of the state.140 
English-Only proponents have unsuccessfully attempted to use 
Proposition 63 to eliminate services such as bilingual voting assistance 
and bilingual education.141 The amendment has also been cited by 
defendants in cases where discriminatory policies have been chal-
lenged. In Teresa P. v. Berkeley Unified School District,142 U.S. English 
(USE), a prominent group supporting the measure filed an amicus 
brief asserting that Proposition 63 explicitly rejected bilingual educa-
tion.143 The court did not reach the issue raised by the group, but the 
filing of the brief is indicative of the sentiments of such grassroots 
organizations. l44 
Similarly, in Gutierrez v. Municipal Court145 the defendants used 
Proposition 63 as a defense against a wrongful discharge claim, main-
taining that the firing of a non-English speaking employee was justified 
since an English-only workplace was required by the State Constitu-
tion. 146 The workplace in question was the clerk's office of a municipal 
court,147 so the defendants argued that the amendment required the 
use of English in all official state business, thereby requiring the plain-
tiff, a Hispanic employee, to communicate in English while at work.148 
The Ninth Circuit rejected the constitutional argument since the in-
terpretation was not a fair reading of the provision itself and since the 
legislative history accompanying the ballot initiative did not support 
such a reading.149 
139Id. at § 6(c). 
140 Id. 
141 Califa, supra note 137, at 302. 
142Civ. Action No. C 87 2396 DLJ (N.D. Cal. Feb. 14, 1989). 
143Califa, supra note 137, at 302 & n.69. This group's reputation was severely tainted eight 
years ago when its founder wrote a memo suggesting that Hispanics have "greater reproductive 
powers" than Anglos. Headden, supra note 137, at 40. 
144 Id. at n.69. 
145 838 F.2d 1031 (9th Cir. 1988). 
146Id. at 1043. 
147Id. at 1036. 
148Id. at 1043. 
149Id. at 1043-44. 
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Proponents of the English-Only amendment claim that it will force 
recent immigrants to learn English, something they believe the immi-
grants have not been doing. I50 They maintain that these immigrants' 
inability to speak English makes them poor, unskilled, and uneducated, 
thereby posing a threat to the nation. l5l However, 98% of Hispanic 
parents think that knowing English is essential, and the waiting lists for 
English classes are tremendous, thereby indicating that legal coer-
cion is unnecessary.I52 This attempt to mold immigrants into clones of 
"Americans" is misguided and unnecessary, and partially arises out of 
fear that Spanish will one day overtake English as the dominant lan-
guage of the United States.153 
The push for an English-Only policy reflects an irrational fear of 
Hispanic immigration and power which has become instilled in Ameri-
can citizens. I54 Especially in California, where the border is loosely 
controlled, such measures represent simplistic solutions to complex 
problems, born out of racism and fear. I55 It is also a reminder of the 
state's history of prejudice toward speakers of foreign tongues. I56 The 
1986 Constitutional amendment can be seen as both a result of many 
years of immigration and racism and a precursor to the extreme meas-
ures proposed by Proposition 187 and passed by the voters of the state. 
B. Education 
The education system of California has not escaped the effects of 
racism and discrimination. Education has been described by the Su-
preme Court as "[p]erhaps the most important function of state and 
local governments" and "[t]he very foundation of good citizenship."157 
However, at both the public school and university levels in California, 
segregation and discrimination against those of Hispanic lineage has 
been prevalent. I5S 
150Califa, supra note 137, at 312. 
151Id. at 313. 
152Id. at 316. 
153 See id. at 322. 
154 See id. at 328. 
155 See id. at 329. 
156 See Headden, supra note 137, at 41-42. 
157 Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954). 
158 See generally Cooke, The Segregation of Mexican-American School Children, supra note 130. 
This is one type of measure that was also leveled against those of Japanese descent in the early 
part of the century. In 1909, a bill was proposed in the California legislature to segregate the 
public schools along racial lines. Rhetoric described Japanese school children as "[mlaturedJaps, 
with their base minds, their lascivious thoughts, multiplied by their race ... sitting in the seats 
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In the 1940s, public schools in California were segregated by race 
along the lines of white or Mexican the same way they were segregated 
between whites and blacks.159 In the late years of World War II, parents 
of Mexican-American school-children and the organized group known 
as the League of United Latin American Citizens160 brought suit against 
four Orange County school districts for their segregation policies. 161 
The plaintiffs asked the Federal District Court for an injunction, main-
taining that their Fourteenth Amendment equal protection right had 
been violated.162 
The federal judge for the Southern District of California declared 
that the segregation of pupils of Mexican descent was unconstitutional 
stating, "[AJ paramount requisite in the American system of public 
education is social equality. It must be open to all children by unified 
school association regardless of lineage. "163 The Ninth Circuit affir-
med. 164 Although the case was not decided on the issue of race, since 
Mexicans were considered Caucasian, the court decided that the Mexi-
can children were classified based on their national descent and were 
deprived of the equal protection of the laws.165 Despite this decision, 
de facto segregation of Mexican-Americans and white public school 
students still existed in some counties of California.166 
In the area of higher education, California courts have held that 
undocumented immigrants cannot qualify as residents of California for 
tuition purposes.167 The decision followed an earlier published opinion 
handed down by the California Attorney General John K. Van De 
Kamp.l68 Such a statutory provision was held not to deny such immi-
grants equal protection of the laws given that the state had numerous 
legitimate interests.169 They included: not subsidizing violations of law, 
preferring to educate its own lawful residents, avoiding enhancing the 
next to the pure maids of California . . .. " Daniels, The Progressives Draw the Color Line, supra 
note 79, at 118. 
159 Cooke, The Segregation of Mexican-American School Children, supra note 130, at 220. 
160This group remains active today, and is a plaintiff in one of the legal challenges to 
Proposition 187. See, e.g., League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Wilson, No. CV. 94-7569 (S.D. 
Cal. Dec. 14, 1994), available in LEXIS, Hottop Library, Extra File. 
161 Cooke, The Segregation of Mexican-American School Children, supra note 130, at 224. 
162Id. 
163 Id. at 226. 
164Westminster School Dist. v. Mendez, 161 F.2d 774, 781 (1947). 
165 Id. at 777. 
166 Cooke, The Segregation of Mexican-American School Children, supra note 130, at 228. 
167 Regents Univ. of Cal. v. Superior Ct., 276 Cal. Rptr. 197, 201 (Cal. App. 2 Dist. 1990) 
168 Regents, 276 Cal. Rptr at 201-02. 
169 Id. at 202. 
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employment prospects of those to whom employment is forbidden by 
law, and not subsidizing the education of students whose parents, 
because of the risk of deportation, are less likely to pay taxes.l70 
C. Medical Treatment 
The denial of non-emergency medical treatment to undocumented 
immigrants is a major component of Proposition 187, but like many 
other aspects of the initiative, it is not a new concept for California. 
Health care providers and others have often challenged the provision 
of free health services to undocumented immigrants, but they thank-
fully have not found a sympathetic ear in the courts of the state.l7l 
In 1989, an undocumented immigrant who had been admitted to 
the UCLA Medical Center and treated with chemotherapy for acute 
leukemia, was denied Medi-CaP72 payment for a necessary bone mar-
row transplant because the hospital did not deem it to be emergency 
treatment, which was all he was entitled to as an undocumented immi-
grant.173 The court ruled against the hospital in determining that the 
transplant was covered by the portion of the statute applicable to the 
patient and instructed that payment be rendered.174 
Similarly, in 1990, the State Department of Health sought to deny 
Medi-Cal coverage to undocumented immigrants having medical needs 
for long-term care or kidney dialysis.175 The state also sought to require 
individuals applying for medical care for emergency and pregnancy-
related services to disclose extensive information regarding their own 
immigration status or that of members of their family or household.176 
The court issued a preliminary injunction that was upheld on appeal, 
citing the persuasive evidence that those immigrants challenging the 
regulation would risk serious disability or even death should their 
treatments be denied. 177 
170Id. 
171 They may have found a sympathetic ear in Congress. House Speaker Newt Gingrich 
recently proposed a multibillion dollar plan under which the federal government would fully 
reimburse states for providing emergency medical care to undocumented immigrants. Tony 
Perry, Gingrich Offers to Fully Repay States on Immigrant Care, L.A. TiMES, Oct. 21, 1995, at AI. 
172 Medi-Cal is California's version of the federal Medicaid program which provides health 
services to indigent California residents. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 14000-16000 (West 1991). 
173 Dominguez v. Superior Ct., 226 Cal. App. 3d 524, 527 (1990). 
174Id. at 534. 
175 Crespin v. Kizer, 226 Cal. App. 3d 498, 503 (1990). 
176Id. at 503-04. 
177Id. at 507. 
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D. Welfare Benefits 
Recendy, the California Legislature has successfully legislated to 
cut off social services aside from medical care to undocumented im-
migrants. Although the measures are not necessarily as radical in 
nature as Proposition 187, and often follow similar federal guidelines, 
a characteristic they share is that the burden of assessing the immigra-
tion status of an individual is often placed on individual providers of 
services. This type of enforcement will undoubtedly lead to suspicion 
and interrogation of anyone of Hispanic appearance, a discriminatory 
and racist process. 
Two years ago, California enacted a durational residency require-
ment for receipt of Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) 
benefits, which did not allow full benefits until an applicant had re-
sided in the state for one full year. 178 Such a requirement would un-
doubtedly affect the undocumented population and was likely designed 
to deter migration to California. However, the statute was challenged 
by u.S. citizen plaintiffs who had moved to California from other 
states. 179 The District Court, affirmed by the Ninth Circuit, struck down 
the statute on equal protection grounds, stating that deterring migra-
tion by poor people into the state is not a compelling state interest. 180 
It is difficult to discern from the case whether the outcome would have 
been different had the statute been challenged by undocumented 
residents of California, but the exclusionary spirit of that residency 
requirement has been exhibited in Proposition 187.181 
Another significant recent measure prevents undocumented im-
migrants from using state job training services and requires job train-
ing agencies to verify the citizenship status of their clients.182 In reality, 
this means that the receptionist or intake worker at the job training 
facility, a private citizen, will be required to visually identify those 
clients likely to be undocumented, ask them to show their documents 
and ask them to leave or report them when they fail to do so. 
In similar fashion, the city of Costa Mesa, an affluent area of 
Orange County, attempted to cut financial support to the charities and 
178 CAL. WELF. & IN ST. CODE § 11450.03 (West Supp. 1995). 
179 Green v. Anderson, 811 F. Supp. 516, 517 (E.D. Cal. 1993), aff'd, 26 F.3d 95, 96 (9th Cir. 
1994). 
180 Green v. Anderson, 26 F.3d 95, 96 (9th Cir. 1994). 
181 See supra note 12 and accompanying text. 
182Jenifer M. Bosco, Undocumented Immigrants, Economic Justice, and Welfare Reform in 
California, 8 GEO. IMMIGR. LJ. 71, 75 (1994). 
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agencies that provide food, clothing and other aid to undocumented 
workers by withholding federal grant money.I83 Their discriminatory 
effort was derailed when Jack Kemp, United States Secretary of Hous-
ing and Urban Development, rejected a ruling that would have per-
mitted the cutoff, relying on the "clear injustices and absurdities" 
proposed by the measure. I84 
E. Encinitas, California and the Green Valley Immigrant 
Camp- Testing Ground for Proposition 187 
The coastal city of Encinitas, in Southern San Diego County, has 
been the center of the controversy surrounding undocumented immi-
grants for many years. I85 The city built itself up around a large settle-
ment of Mexican and Central American immigrants, an area known as 
Green Valley.I86 The encampment eventually became surrounded by 
upper-class suburban neighborhoods, whose residents did not take 
kindly to the undocumented population's presence. I87 
The main complaint residents raised in the mid-1980s regarding 
these immigrants was that they congregated on El Camino Real, the 
main road through the community, to wait for building or landscaping 
work, of which there was plenty because of the extensive residential 
development in the area. I88 Residents associated other problems with 
these migrant workers, such as believing that they were a drain on 
property values, their basic needs made them potential criminals, and 
their economic position contrasted sharply with the economic class of 
the surrounding communities; basically, they were just too different 
and not good enough to live near the wealthy residents of Encinitas. I89 
The city established a task force to deal with the problem of undocu-
mented immigrants, which regularly received complaints from local 
residents about Green Valley residents' excessive noise, drunkenness, 
defecation in public, and trespassing. I90 Since many residents of Green 
Valley had obtained permission to reside legally in the United States 
as Seasonal Agricultural Workers under provisions of the Immigration 
Reform and Control Act of 1986, it was becoming more difficult to rid 
183 Patrick McDonnell, Migrant Labur: City Issue Now, LA TIMES, Nov. 17, 1990, at 1. 
184Id. 
185 See CHAVEZ, supra note 8, at 83-87. 
186Id. at 83. 
187Id. at 84. 
188 See id. at 84-85. 
189 See id. at 85. 
190 Id. at 87. 
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the community of their presence than simply having federal immigra-
tion officials round them up and deport them. l9l Therefore, the resi-
dents of Encinitas turned to the health department for assistance. 
While residents of Encinitas had branded the Green Valley inhabi-
tants as uncivilized, the operational restaurants that the undocumented 
residents had constructed within their encampment were the catalyst 
that sparked the health department's involvement in the problem.192 
An investigation was undertaken, and on September 27, 1988, an 
inspector for San Diego County's Environmental Health Services signed 
an abatement order for Green Valley.193 
The order mandated that the owner of the property either abate 
the dangerous conditions by providing toilets, running water and code-
complying buildings, or dismantle the camp.194 The owners decided to 
dismantle, which spawned controversy and protest throughout the 
community.195 The dismantling was delayed by community and relig-
ious groups concerned with the future of the camp's residents.196 How-
ever, the camp was eliminated in January of 1989, thereby bringing to 
light the problem of a lack of low-income housing in the area when 
the Green Valley residents, and residents of other similar encamp-
ments, had no place to gO.197 
The shortage of housing caused other encampments to spring up 
in other valleys of the Encinitas area.198 It also led to litigation where 
three homeless day laborers challenged the validity of the 1990 Gen-
eral Plan for the City of Encinitas.199 The plaintiffs claimed that the city 
had failed to comply with provisions of the California Planning and 
Zoning Law,200 specifically the housing elements of the statute. Al-
though days after the lawsuit was filed, the California Department of 
Housing and Community Development informed Encinitas that its 
191Id. at 94. 
192Id. at 107. 
193Id. at 83. 
194 See id. at 109. 
195Id. 
196Id. 
197Id. at 114. 
198Id. at U5. 
199 Hernandez v. City of Encinitas, 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d 875, 878 (Cal. App. 4 Dist. 1994). 
200 CAL. GoV'T CODE § 65000-66409 (West 1991). Basically, the homeless workers contended 
that Encinitas, in adopting its plan, failed to "adequately analyze the special housing needs of 
farm workers and the homeless" as required by section 65583(a)(6), and that its land use plan 
violated sections 65913 and 65913.1 requiring them to attempt to provide housing at the lowest 
possible cost. Hernandez, 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 879. 
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plans for future housing development had not met state standards,201 
the court ultimately upheld Encinitas' general plan, finding its zoning 
for high density lower cost housing to be adequate given the city's 
expressed desire to preserve a residential character for their commu-
nity.202 Therefore, although only twenty-four percent of the 5380 dwell-
ing units to be developed were in multi-family land use categories, the 
Encinitas plan, which basically forced the former inhabitants of Green 
Valley-type encampments to go elsewhere for shelter, was upheld by 
the California courts.203 
Encinitas did not desist in their attempt to rid their city ofundocu-
men ted immigrants. In October of 1990, the city sent a bill for 
$281,695.25 to the General Accounting Office in Washington for ex-
penses it incurred solving the migrant labor problems of the 1980s, 
problems it blamed on the Federal Government's immigration poli-
cies.204 The move came after the city became the first in California to 
declare a state of emergency concerning migrant laborers.205When the 
Federal Government rejected the request to declare a state of emer-
gency, Encinitas adopted an anti-solicitation ordinance that outlawed 
the curbside hiring that had been relied upon by those undocumented 
migrant workers.206 However, the city was forced to rescind the ordi-
nance when a federal judge ruled it a violation of the First Amend-
ment's protection of free speech.207 
It is not a leap of logic to argue that Proposition 187 represents a 
culmination of the policies and initiatives of the past one hundred 
years in California. As some segments of the population and the po-
litical community have attempted to guard the resources and benefits 
of the state for themselves, they have been met at almost every turn by 
a judiciary whose tolerance for such actions has varied. For the most 
part, the courts have been sympathetic to plaintiffs denied services, 
and have ruled in their favor. Perhaps this resistance to more low-scale 
measures led to the frustration which produced Proposition 187, or 
perhaps its passage is just a reflection of the current political climate. 
201John M. Glionna, Encinitas Councilwoman Takes on Migrant Issue, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 27, 
1989, at Metro 1. 
202 See Hernandez, 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 889. 
203 See id. at 884, 889. 
204John M. Glionna, Encinitas Bills U.S. fM Costs Tied to Immigrant Problems, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 
31, 1990, at Metro 8. 
205Id. 
206 Jorge Casuso, Suburb Fights to Curb Influx of Illegal Aliens, SACRAMENTO BEE, May 18, 1990, 
atB4. 
207 McDonnell, supra note 183, at 1. 
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In any event, the courts have already become involved in the initiative's 
existence, halting it indefinitely. Since it is likely that the Supreme 
Court will eventually rule on the validity of Proposition 187, this Note 
will next examine the potential outcome of one particular type of 
challenge. 
V. THE CURRENT SUPREME COURT-POSSIBLE OUTCOME OF AN 
EQUAL PROTECTION CHALLENGE 
A. Historical Analysis of Alienage208 Classifications 
Supreme Court equal protection jurisprudence regarding the status 
of non-citizens, both documented and undocumented, is anything but 
settled. The level of scrutiny applied to classifications based on alien-
age has varied over the years not only as the Court's membership and 
leadership has changed, but also as the relevant issues in the cases 
reaching that level have changed.209 The modern courts have used a 
bifurcated scheme of analysis; some alienage classifications are sub-
jected to strict scrutiny,210 while others pertaining to "political func-
tions" are subjected to a lower level.211 It is important to note that the 
following line of cases where strict scrutiny was used do not deal with 
the issue of undocumented immigrants, but with those non-citizens 
legally present in the United States. 
The first case to use strict scrutiny to strike down a classification 
based on alienage was Graham v. Richardson.212 The Court ruled that 
both Arizona's and Pennsylvania's denial of welfare benefits to aliens 
based on their citizenship and residency status violated the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.213 Justice Blackmun 
stated that, "The classifications involved in the instant cases ... are 
20BIn this section I will use the words "alien" and "alienage" to avoid confusion, because the 
Courts have traditionally referred to undocumented immigrants in this manner. 
209 See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 230 (1982); Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291, 296 (1978); 
Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 376 (1971). 
210 Strict scrutiny is the highest level of constitutional scrutiny; it requires the government to 
show that the challenged policy serves a crucial or "compelling" governmental interest, is a 
substantially effective means of furthering the compelling governmental interest, and is a neces-
sary or least restrictive method of achieving the governmental goal. Richard A. Brisbin, Jr. & 
Edward V. Heck, The Battle Over Strict Scrutiny; Coalitional Conflict in the Rehnquist Court, 32 
SANTA CLARA L. REv. 1049, 1053 (1992). 
211 GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 680 (12th ed. 1991); see infra note 219 and 
accompanying text. 
212 403 U.S. 365 (1971). 
213 Graham, 403 U.S. at 376. 
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inherently suspect and are therefore subject to strict judicial scru-
tiny .... "214 There were no dissenters in Graham, but the conserva-
tive Justice William Rehnquist had not yet been appointed to the 
Court. 
Rehnquist, the current Chief Justice, was the sole dissenter in the 
next major case applying strict scrutiny to strike down a classification 
based on alienage.215 Justice Blackmun again wrote the majority opin-
ion in Sugarman v. Dougall, holding that a state could not constitution-
ally deny non-citizens the right to hold positions in civil service.216 In 
his dissent, Justice Rehnquist stated that strict scrutiny was not appro-
priate in cases involving alienage because aliens were capable of altering 
their citizenship status, thereby rendering that status not an immutable 
characteristic.217 He therefore concluded that legislative classifications 
based on citizenship should be subject only to a rational basis test of 
equal protection.218 
Mter Sugarman, the court began to erode the use of strict scrutiny 
for classifications based on alienage by applying a more deferential 
analysis to exclusions of aliens from public employment using the 
"political function" exception.219 The court upheld exclusions of aliens 
from employment as state troopers,220 public school teachers,221 and 
probation officers,222 all based on the justification that citizenship bore 
a rational relationship to the employment in question.223 The dissenters 
in these cases, Justices Blackmun, Brennan, Marshall and Stevens, 
would have applied strict scrutiny.224 
214Id. 
215 See Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 642 (1973). 
216Id. at 646. 
217 See id. at 657 (Rehnquist,]., dissenting). 
218Id. at 658 (Rehnquist,]., dissenting). 
219 See Cabell v. Chavez-Salido, 454 U.S. 432, 438-39 (1981); Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 
68, 74 (1979); Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291, 296 (1978). This erosion stemmed from an 
exception to the Sugarman rule of strict scrutiny articulated by Justice Blackmun in his opinion, 
where he stated that "our scrutiny will not be so demanding where we deal with matters resting 
firmly within a State's constitutional prerogatives ... to preserve the basis conception of a political 
community." Sugarman, 413 U.S. at 648. 
220 Foley, 435 U.S. at 300. 
221 Ambach, 441 U.S. at 81. 
222 Cabell, 454 U.S. at 447. 
223 See Cabell, 454 U.S. at 444; Ambach, 441 U.S. at 80; Foley, 435 U.S. at 300. 
224 See Cabell, 454 U.S. at 450 (Blackmun,]., dissenting); Ambach, 441 U.S. at 84 (Blackmun, 
]., dissenting); Foley, 435 U.S. at 303 (Marshall,]., dissenting). 
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These dissenters became part of the majority in Bernal v. Fainter, 
where Justice Marshall used strict scrutiny to strike down a state law 
requiring notary publics to be citizens.225 The political function excep-
tion to strict scrutiny that had been used in the prior cases was deemed 
to be inapplicable here, since that exception was only to apply to 
personnel" [iJ nvested either with policy making responsibility or broad 
discretion in the execution of public policy .... "226 Not surprisingly, 
Justice Rehnquist dissented, stating only that he did so for the same 
reasons as he had in Sugarman. 227 
These previous cases all involved the status of non-citizens legally 
in the United States, while Proposition 187 is directed only at undocu-
mented immigrants. However, as one commentator has stated, "[iJf a 
person's status as an alien is not a problematic basis for differential 
treatment under equal protection, then, a fortiori, a person's status as 
an undocumented alien is not a problematic basis. "228 Intuitively, using 
the Rehnquist reasoning, the fact that non-citizens legally residing in 
the United States are not entitled to additional protection would ren-
der it virtually certain that those non-citizens illegally residing in this 
country, who would be affected by Proposition 187, would likewise not 
be entitled to anything but rational basis review. 
The Supreme Court decision likely to weigh heavily in the equal 
protection debate over Proposition 187 is the landmark Plyler v. Doe. 229 
In that case the Court struck down, on equal protection grounds, a 
Texas statute denying free public education to undocumented immi-
grant children.23o The Court immediately rejected the state's argument 
that undocumented immigrants, because of their immigration status, 
are not "persons" within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
and therefore are not entitled to the protections of the Equal Protec-
tion Clause.231 The Court stated that "[tJhe Equal Protection Clause 
was intended to work nothing less than the abolition of all .. .invidious 
class-based legislation. That objective is fundamentally at odds with the 
225 Bernal v. Fainter, 467 U.S. 216, 227 (1984). 
226Id. at 226. 
227Id. at 228 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
228 Michael J. Perry, Equal Protection, Judicial Activism, and the Intellectual Agenda of Consti-
tutional Theory: Reflections on, and Beyond, Plyler v. Doe, 44 U. PITT. L. REv. 329, 335 (1983). 
229 457 U.S. 202 (1982). 
230Id. at 230. 
231 Id. at 210. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment had already been held 
applicable to undocumented immigrants. Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 238 (1896); 
Yick Wo v. Hopkins, U8 U.S. 356,369 (1886). 
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power the State asserts here to classifY persons subject to its laws as 
nonetheless excepted from its protection. "232 
The Plyler majority appears to use a rational basis test to rule that 
Texas could not exclude the children of illegal aliens from public 
education.233 However, the Court discussed at length the nature of the 
classification of the alien children, as well as the nature of the right to 
education, without concluding either that the children were a suspect 
class, or that education was a fundamental right.234 The Court stated 
that undocumented aliens themselves are not a suspect class, but that 
their children, brought to Texas through no fault of their own, are 
entitled to heightened protection.235 Again, Justice Rehnquistjoined in 
a surprising dissent by Chief Justice Burger, in which they refused to 
apply heightened scrutiny to the exclusion of the undocumented alien 
children, despite their lack of responsibility for their statuS.236 
In dismissing numerous state arguments as to the purpose of the 
statute, Justice Brennan stated, "It is difficult to understand precisely 
what the State hopes to achieve by promoting the creation and per-
petuation of a subclass of illiterates within our boundaries .... ''237 While 
the Plyler decision is difficult to understand, and its ruling was limited 
to its unique facts by the concurrence,238 its overall effect on the states 
is clear. It does not preclude most state efforts to discourage undocu-
mented immigration, since the Court states that the efforts will be 
sustained as long as they serve important governmental interests.239 
Similarly, it does not require states to provide undocumented immi-
grants with any social services other than education.24o 
B. Possible Equal Protection Analysis of Proposition 187 
The most interesting and disturbing issue surrounding the poten-
tial analysis of the various aspects of Proposition 187 is the current 
make-up of the Court. The Plyler case is extremely relevant, as is the 
232 Plyler, 457 U.S. at 213. 
233 See id. at 220. 
234 See id. at 218-23. 
235Id. at 220. 
236Id. at 245, (Burger, CJ., dissenting). 
237Id. at 230. 
238Id. at 236 (Powell, J., concurring). 
239 Elizabeth Hull, Undocumented Alien Children and Free Public Education: An Analysis of 
Plyler v. Doe, 44 U. PITT. L. REv. 409, 430 (1983). 
240Id. 
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level of review the current Court will use to assess the initiative.241 The 
current Court, consisting primarily of conservative appointees of Presi-
dents Reagan and Bush, has not yet had an opportunity to deal with 
an alienage classification by a state, and Proposition 187 is the next 
likely opportunity.242 
Strict adherence to precedent would likely lead to the striking 
down of at least Section 7 of Proposition 187, since it conflicts directly 
with the decision in Plyler. In that case, a heightened level of scrutiny 
was applied not because undocumented persons are a suspect clas-
sification, but because the law imposed a "hardship on a discrete class 
of children not accountable for their disabling statuS."243 There is no 
reason to believe that the children who will be affected by Section 7 
are any more responsible for their undocumented status than the 
Texas children of the 1980s. 
It is difficult to discern the standard used by the majority in Plyler, 
since they did not openly adhere to either a rational basis or strict 
scrutiny mode of analysis.244 The Court essentially balanced a quasi-fun-
damental right and a quasi-suspect classification against the state's 
prof erred interest, without stating that an intermediate level of scru-
tiny was being used.245 This use of quasi-suspect classifications and 
quasi-fundamental rights by the majority led the dissent to state, per-
haps accurately, that the decision was of little use outside of its unique 
facts. 246 Supreme Court review of Section 7 of Proposition 187 would 
involve the same facts as Plyler, but whether the current Court would 
apply the quasi-suspect, quasi-fundamental right analysis remains doubt-
fuJ.247 Although the Court may be limited by precedent in ruling on 
241 Also interesting and perhaps ultimately important is the fact that Peter Schey, attorney 
for the League of United Latin American Citizens in the current challenge to Proposition 187, 
argued for the plaintiffs in Plyler in 1982. LULAC Transcript, supra note 1, at 28. 
242 See Jennifer Huffman, Note, Justice Rehnquist and Alienage as a Suspect Classification, 7 
GEO. IMMIGR. LJ. 845, 863 (1993). 
243 Plyler, 457 U.S. at 223. 
244 John F. Casey, Comment, Plyler v. Doe: The QJtasi Fundamental Right Emerges in Equal 
Protection Analysis, 19 NEW. ENG. L. REv. 151, 165 (1983--84). 
245Id. at 167. The author of this comment also notes that Justices Brennan and Marshall 
used this case to argue for a more flexible mode of equal protection analysis that does not strictly 
adhere to the tier system. Id. at 168. 
246Plyler, 457 U.S. at 243 (Burger, CJ., dissenting). 
247 It is interesting to note that the ACLU's complaint articulates the quasi-suspect, quasi-fun-
damentallanguage, along with stronger strict scrutiny language. Gregorio T. Complaint at 1 55, 
Gregorio T. v. Wilson, No. 94-7652 JMI (GHlx) (C.D. Cal. Nov. 9, 1994) available in LEXIS, 
Hottop Library, Extra File. 
308 BOSTON COLLEGE THIRD WORLD LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 16:2 
Section 7, the other portions of Proposition 187 denying welfare benefits 
and medical care have no precedent behind them, and therefore will 
likely be subjected to a deferential rational basis analysis in which the 
State will solely be required to offer a minimally rational reason for the 
measures.248 
An argument likely to be raised by the State of California is an 
economic one similar to that raised by Texas in Plyler.249 The state 
argued that its compelling interest in the classification was to "pre-
serv[e] ... the state's limited resources for the education of its lawful 
residents."25o The Court emphatically rejected this argument in Plyler, 
stating that, "[o]f course, a concern for the preservation of resources 
standing alone can hardly justify the classification used in allocating 
those resources,"251 but the current economic conditions of California 
could be shown to be sufficiently dire to render the economic argu-
ment acceptable to a rational basis analysis ifit is accompanied by other 
state interests.252 Governor Wilson has already sued the Federal Gov-
ernment to recover funds California has spent on undocumented 
immigrant services; such a lawsuit, along with other economic data 
could serve as compelling evidence of economic necessity for Proposi-
tion 187. 
However, the Plyler Court did articulate three colorable state in-
terests that they believed may support the statute.253 An important 
example, which is likely to be argued by California, is the state's 
legitimate interest in protecting itself from an influx of illegal immi-
grants, an interest at the very heart of Proposition 187.254 In Plyler, 
however, the Court did not ascertain a connection between excluding 
undocumented children from schools and immigration control.255 
Leaving Section 7 aside, si~ce the precedent of Plyler weighs strongly 
against its survival, extending the Court's rationale could lead to Propo-
sition 187's surviving scrutiny if the Court finds that it furthers Califor-
nia's interest in curbing unlawful immigration. The Court has stated, 
248 See Plyler, 457 U.S. at 223-24. 
249 See id. at 227. 
250 Id. 
251 Id. 
252 See id. 
253 Id. at 228--30. 
254 Id. at 228. The court also articulated a state interest in improving the quality of education, 
which would require a showing that the exclusion of undocumented children is likely to improve 
the quality of education in the State. Id. at 229. 
255 Id. at 228. 
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"[W]e cannot conclude that the States are without any power to deter 
the influx of persons entering the United States against federal law, 
and whose numbers might have a discernible impact on traditional 
state concerns."256 Therefore, the holding in Plyler leaves open the 
possibility that if California can show that Proposition 187, in whole or 
in part, furthers its interest in preventing undocumented immigrants 
from adversely affecting the state, it can be upheld without specifically 
overruling Plyler. 
To show that the measure furthers such an interest, the Court 
appears to require that the benefit or service denied to undocumented 
persons by the state be a factually proven incentive for illegal entry.257 
Therefore, if California can show that its education, welfare, and medi-
cal care services are dominant incentives for the influx of immigrants 
into the State, the Court may find both a State interest and a relation-
ship between that interest and the classification, sufficient to support 
the restrictions in Proposition 187.258 The State will also have to show 
that denial of those services to undocumented immigrants will have 
some effect on the influx of immigrants into the State of California.259 
The most interesting aspect of an analysis of Proposition 187 is 
that the Court which decided Plyler in 1982 has been effectively dis-
mantled by retirements and appointments by Republican presidents. 
Of the majority which struck down the statute, only Justice Stevens 
remains, while Justices Rehnquist and O'Connor were among the 
dissenters who would have upheld the statute subject to a rational basis 
examination.260 With the notable absences of Justice Brennan and 
especially Justice Blackmun, who wrote the majority of the opinions 
applying strict scrutiny to classifications based on alienage, what remains 
today is a conservative court with Chief Justice Rehnquist as its leader. 
Chief Justice Rehnquist's position on the proper analysis of alien-
age, documented or undocumented, is clear; he does not believe it to 
be entitled to either strict scrutiny or any form of heightened scru-
tiny.261 He has emphatically stated his belief that alienage is not a 
suspect classification since it is not an immutable characteristic like 
256Id. at 228, n.23. 
257 See id. at 228. The court found that employment opportunity, and not education, was the 
dominant incentive for illegal immigration into Texas. Id. 
258 See id. 
259 See id. at n.24. 
260Id. at 203. 
261 Huffman, supra note 242, at 859. 
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race, because the alien always has the option of becoming a citizen.262 
His equal protection jurisprudence in general is extremely deferential 
to states, and has been described as "rational basis with a vengeance. "263 
He has been willing to allow states to classify based on alienage for 
almost any rational reason.264Justice Rehnquist would likely uphold the 
provisions of Proposition 187, but the ultimate question is whether his 
current, admittedly conservative, peers would follow his lead. 
Justice Scalia has been considered, along with Justices Rehnquist 
and Kennedy, to be part of a coalition that "legitimizes 'reasonable' 
restrictions on the rights of disadvantaged groupS."265 This indicates 
that he would support a rational basis review of the measure, especially 
given the fact that undocumented immigrants were not intended to be 
protected by the Constitution, an important criteria for Scalia's equal 
protection jurisprudence. Justice Thomas, although not on the Court 
for an extended period, would likely be included in that coalition. 
Justice O'Connor, while not necessarily a part of that coalition, dis-
sented in Plyler, which makes her a likely candidate to join Chief Justice 
Rehnquist, as well as Justices Scalia, Thomas and Kennedy, in applying 
rational basis scrutiny to uphold Proposition 187, or the portions of it 
which can be shown to advance a state interest. 
Justice Stevens, like former Justices Brennan and Marshall, has 
consistently rejected the strict tiers of equal protection analysis.266 A 
detailed analysis of his jurisprudence is inappropriate here, but it is 
enough to note that he seeks to assess the "relevance of the [ques-
tioned] classification to a valid public purpose."267 He would be more 
likely than the other justices to examine Proposition 187 more closely 
and attempt to relate California's stated purposes to the classifications 
made by the measure.268 It is also important to note that Justice Stevens 
is the one remaining member of the Plyler majority, a majority which 
created a quasi-suspect classification in order to protect the undocu-
mented children denied education in Texas.269 
262 Sugarman, 413 U.S. at 657; see Huffman, supra note 242, at 850. 
263 Thomas Kleven, The Constitutional Philosophy of justice William H. Rehnquist, 8 VT. L. REv. 
1,25 (1983). 
264Id. 
265 Brisbin & Heck, supra note 210, at 1102. 
266 Note, justice Stevens' Equal Protection jurisprudence, 100 HARv. L. REv. 1146, 1154 (1983). 
This Note articulates an in-depth analysis of Justice Stevens' jurisprudence and equal protection 
theory. 
267Id. 
268 See id. 
269 See Plyler, 457 U.S. at 203. 
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Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, three newer additions to the 
Court, given what we know about the other six justices, could have little 
impact on the outcome of an equal protection challenge to Proposi-
tion 187. While none of the three are as reputably conservative as 
Justice Rehnquist, they are unlikely to be as strong protectors of the 
rights of the disadvantaged and politically powerless as were Justices 
Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun, three Plyler majority members no-
tably absent from the Court today. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The vision for the future of Proposition 187 in California depends 
upon what both sides of the issue consider the purpose behind the 
ballot initiative. Those who believe its passage is essentially a wake up 
call for the Federal Government to adhere to its responsibility to 
enforce the immigration laws could be pleasantly satisfied,270 especially 
given a recent State of the Union address in which President Clinton 
indicated his support for tighter borders with Mexico. Even if Propo-
sition 187 does not survive judicial scrutiny, California has succeeded 
in putting undocumented immigration at the forefront of American 
politics. Other states like Florida have followed California by beginning 
their own grassroots efforts against undocumented immigration. 
Those who hope for Proposition 187's survival in order for the 
State to be rid of the undocumented could be disappointed. As has 
been indicated by the failure of district attorneys to use the sentencing 
provision of the only surviving portion of the initiative, practical suc-
cess of the provisions of Proposition 187 is speculative at best.271 Many 
of those responsible for enforcing the various denials of rights, includ-
ing several state officials, have come out against the initiative, and their 
opposition is not likely to cease even with a Supreme Court decision 
upholding Proposition 187.272 
Whether the Supreme Court will uphold the measure remains to 
be seen. An equal protection challenge to any portion of the initiative 
except Section 7 denying public education could prove unsuccessful 
270 See The Message of Prop. 187, supra note 11, at Cfi. 
271 See Feldman, Forgers Get 6 Months, supra note 71, at l. 
272 Plaintiffs who signed on to the stipulated restraining order include Assemblyman Richard 
Polanco, Los Angeles City Board of Education Members Victoria Castro and Jeff Horten, Los 
Angeles City Council persons Mike Hernandez and Jackie Goldberg and Pomona Mayor Edward 
Cortez. See LULAC Stipulated Restraining Order at 15, League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. 
Wilson, No. 94-7569-MRP (CD. Cal. Nov. 22, 1994), available in LEXlS, Hottop Library, Extra File. 
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given the Court's membership. The state interests supporting Proposi-
tion 187 are arguably stronger today than those articulated by Texas 
in the Plyler case a decade ago. Similarly, since Proposition 187 denies 
more than just education to undocumented immigrants, it is feasible 
that successful implementation of the measure could further the State's 
interest in curbing undocumented immigrant immigration in California. 
No matter what happens in the judiciary, Proposition 187 has 
already succeeded in polarizing California politics and in causing ir-
reparable harm to the undocumented immigrant population.273 The 
political right has already begun to capitalize on the momentum of the 
last election by proposing a ban on affirmative action in the State.274 
This raises the very real and very important question of where the 
hysteria will end. As attorney Steven Yagman so eloquently argued in 
favor of a preliminary injunction against Proposition 187, "[A] prelimi-
nary injunction should issue barring the barbarians outside our gates 
from vandalizing our Constitution and from pillaging our society and 
from taking away from the sensible minority of us who deplore Propo-
sition 187 the right to treat others among us in a humane way."275 If we 
as a society are to maintain our humanity in the face of immigration 
problems, Proposition 187, whether declared constitutional or not, 
cannot be fully implemented. 
273 Cara Matthews, Fighting Threats to Immigrants, Advocates for Recent Residents Call Califor-
nia Law Dangerous, NEWSDAY, Feb. 13, 1995, at B7. 
274 See George Skelton, Affirmative Action Issue: Another 187?, L.A. TiMES, Feb. 2, 1995, at 3. 
275 LULAC Transcript at 10, League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Wilson, No. CV 94-7569 
(S.D. Cal. Dec. 14, 1994), available in LEXlS, Hottop Library, Extra File. 
